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Introduction
In the last 50 years, researchers have noticed that electoral turnout in most democracies around
the globe is experiencing a decline. The turnout’s decline is deeply negative in a democracy
since a too low turnout implicates that the government is not actually representing the whole
population, indeed, this might lead legislators to be isolated from citizens’ actual preferences.
If a low turnout is bad for the representation of the populations’ interests, policy makers should
find a way to boost turnout at least for the elections in which the turnout is structurally lower.
Most of the times, in turnout literature, when researchers desire to comprehend which are the
factors that affect turnout they are more focused on the voters’ individual behaviour or on a cross
country comparison between states.
Instead, in this analysis we are going to focus on the overall effect of a concurrent Local election
to the turnout of a National election in Italy. Hence, we are going to analyse a aggregate case in
a single country.
We are interested to see if the concurrence of elections is a feasible way to boost turnout since
this is one of the cheapest and easiest way for policy makers to incentive citizens to vote. Of
course there are some downside in the concurrence of two elections but we are going to discuss
them as well as the upsides.
To answer to our research question, "which is the effect of a concurrent election on turnout?",
we are going to exploit an Italian case, in which we are going to take into consideration three
National elections. The first one, is the Chamber of Deputies election occurred on the 13th of
April 2008. The second election in consideration is the Chamber of Deputies election of 24th
February 2013 and the last election in consideration is the European election of 25th May 2014.
The concurrent election in our case is a Municipal level election that happened in 3.918 mu-
nicipalities simultaneously to the European election of 2014. We selected these three National
elections because the entitled voters are the same, since they are National elections in which
every citizen above 18 years of age is entitled to vote, and because these elections are close in
time.
We are particularly interested in this Italian case since this analysis and its results might be com-
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pared or even repeated with the two National elections that have occurred in the last two years.
Hence, the Chamber of Deputies election occurred on the 4th March 2018 and the European
election of the 26th May 2019 during which a Local concurrent election have occurred as in our
analysis.
For this reason, it is interesting to see if the concurrence of elections have any effect on the
turnout and if policy makers should try to organize as many concurrent elections as possible.
The structure of the analysis is organized as follows. In the first Chapter the focus is on the
literature on turnout, elections and voters mobilization. In the second Chapter are summarized
the main rules of the Italian electoral system, with a particular interest for the elections in con-
sideration. The third Chapter presents the dataset used for the analysis and its two main sources,
as well as some considerations on the data itself. In the fourth Chapter is discussed the model
used in this study, its assumptions and the issues that might apply to our case. The results of
the baseline analysis are reported in the fifth Chapter as well as two robustness checks and an
alternative setting. Finally, we are going to conclude with some considerations on the results
and their implications.
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Chapter 1
Literature review
1.1 Importance of turnout
The outcome of an election is determined by voters’ decisions. “Hence, citizens’ participation
and voting decisions in elections are fundamental inputs in the political process that shapes the
policies adopted by democratic societies.” (Degan and Merlo 2011).
It is important to focus on variations of turnout since it is not only a relevant political outcome
but has also practical implications like "influencing electoral results, public goods provision,
and minority-group representation." (Heath and Ziegfeld 2018). By highlighting these factors,
it seems clear that "low turnout is intrinsically bad for democracy" (Heath and Ziegfeld 2018).
Therefore, if more people do vote the government is more responsive to the citizenry whereas an
inadequate turnout would provide legislators insulation from the citizens themselves (Matland
and Studlar 2004).
Nowadays there is more than an unique form of political participation, indeed potential voters
can choose the form of participation that best suits them. Some examples of other forms of
participation might be binding referendums and protesting or, on a more local level, round tables
and municipal meetings (Vetter 2015, Jackman 1987, Kostelka 2017). This is well described
by the Modernization theory, in which theory citizens have an instrumental orientation towards
participation and choose their preferred form of participation basing their choice solely on a
"cost-benefit calculation"; hence, turnout would increase only if the population would find it
optimal to vote rather than opting out or designate a different form of political participation
(Wilford 2017).
Despite the fact that there exists more forms of political participation, elections are still the best
way of casting a preference and participate in local, national and supra-national politics (Vetter
2015). As Vetter 2015 points out, elections remains important for four main reasons:
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1. Voting in elections is the most cost efficient way of political participation since it requires
the least resources in terms of time, knowledge andmoney; thus, it is themost commonway
of political engagement. As a matter of fact, "the rate of participation is still considerably
higher than with other forms of political involvement as the latter are more resource
dependent".
2. While casting a vote in an election citizens are sure that their decision has equal weight
as the others voters since one person can cast an unique vote.
3. The process of an election is usually highly institutionalised and therefore it is more
transparent than other forms of political participation.
4. Finally, "the outcome of elections is binding, that is, the constituents’ decisions have to be
implemented" (Vetter 2015). The fact that a result in an election is binding reinforce the
citizens’ idea that their vote matter and that the nuisance they bear to vote is not wasted.
1.2 What affects turnout
1.2.1 Classic voter turnout predictors
Most of the literature supports the theory that the main voters’ turnout predictors are factors
linked with political, institutional and socio-demographic factors (Kostelka 2017). These factors
may have a positive or negative effect on the overall turnout, and this effect may be modest or
considerable in size.
Jackman 1987 article is focused on the institutional factors that might affect the turnout’s level.
He assumed that these institutional factors are: nationally competitive districts, electoral dis-
proportionality, multipartyism, unicameralism and compulsory voting. For this reason, one
of the main institutional factors is the type of political system and its rules; for example, if
the president is directly elected from the citizens or if there are multiple institutions for which
citizens are voting for. We can safely assert that if the powers are focused in an unique institution
(i.e. unicameralism) the turnout is going to be higher, since there is more at stake in this type
of election. In fact, Jackman 1987 argues that the more powerful the institution citizens are
voting for the stronger is their incentive to vote and the higher the turnout. Whereas, in the
case of coexistence of more institutions the turnout would be lower than in the previous case,
and between two institutions the turnout is going to be higher for the institution that the voters
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consider more salient1.
Another important institutional factor is compulsory voting. As it would seems obvious, Jack-
man 1987 asserts that compulsory voting has a positive effect on turnout, and estimates that it
increases turnout by 13 points on average. However, Jackman 1987 didn’t interrogate himself
on which types of enforcement or sanctions are necessary in order to generate this effect. It
is clear that compulsory voting increases the cost of not voting as Mattila 2003 highlights, but
only if the sanctions are actually enforced. There are some examples of European countries that
enforce voting through fines; i.e. Greece, Luxembourg and Belgium. However, in countries like
Greece the fine in modest and not always imposed.
The Italian case is a peculiar example of compulsory voting, in fact, in Italy, until 1993, voting
was compulsory. However, there weren’t actual fines, it was regulated by the Constitution as a
civic duty and "the only penalty incurred by an offender is to have its name posted outside the
town hall in his commune residence, and to have his ’certificate of good conduct’, now fallen
largely in disuse, stamped ’Did not vote’ for five years" (Mattila 2003, Jackman 1987).
Blais 2006 sums up the literatures’ knowledge on compulsory voting: "we know that compul-
sory voting increases turnout and that its impact depends on its enforcement. But we do not
know how strict that enforcement must be in order to work. [...] If a sense of duty is a crucial
motivation for voting, most people should be predisposed to vote, and loosely enforced, light
fines should be sufficient to produce a high turnout. And according to rational choice, the factors
that shape the decision to vote or not to vote should be very different when there is a concrete
financial cost associated with abstention.".
For what concerns political factors, two of the most interesting highlighted by literature are
Competitiveness and Decisiveness. Competitiveness and Closeness of an election are synonyms
used to define the difference in the share of votes gained by the winner of the election and the
share of votes of the second most voted party in that election. Whereas, Decisiveness is " the
absolute value of the difference between 50% of the votes and the vote share of the party with the
highest percentage of votes" (Kostelka 2017). The higher these values the lower should be the
final turnout of the election, indeed a high spread of votes between the two most voted parties
make it less likely that a vote will have an effect on the outcome of the election2 and this lowers
the incentives for the individuals to vote.
Socio-demographic and socio-economic factors can be analysed both at aggregate level3 and on
an individual level. Kostelka 2017 asserts that more populous countries show an inferior turnout
1This effect is well described by the First and Second order election theory. We are going to focus on this theory
in a subsequent section.
2We are going to discuss this aspect in the "Models of mobilization" section.
3This is the most common way to implement a cross country comparison.
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than smaller ones, this might be linked with the fact that a more numerous population would
lower the importance of a single vote, thus lowering the citizens’ incentives. Another possible
explanation, summarized by Wilford 2017, is that countries that are smaller in size might have
a greater cohesion and a deeper sense of civic duty. Blais 2006 argues that in his studies the
highest level of voting participation was reported in smaller countries such as Malta. He thought
of three possible explanations for this effect: the first explanation might be the result of a stronger
social network in smaller communities, the second might be due to the fact that voters have the
perception that their vote will have an higher impact on the overall final election result, and the
last explanation, the most plausible in the mind of the author, is that these countries have a lower
ratio between electors and elected, thus making it easier for parties to mobilize voters.
It is well established that age and education have a significant effect on turnout, in fact older
and better educated citizens are more likely to vote. As Blais 2006 summarized, the lowering
of voting age from 21 to 18 has decreased the overall turnout in most democracies by around
3% points. However, Nikolenyi 2010 have shown that in India, when the voting age of the
population was lowered from 21 to 18 years in 1989 the turnout have slightly increased.
On the individual level Jiang 2018 proved that there is a difference in voting behaviour in US
between homeowners and renters in Local elections, but this difference disappears when you
look at the participation on National elections. Homeowners tend to participate more actively
in Local elections driven by their economic self-interest, in fact they are interested on how local
policies might be affecting their property value, or at least they are focused on keeping taxation
policies linked with homeownership as low as possible. Moreover, homeowners are less mobile
than renters and for this reason they are more involved in which policies are implemented in
their residence area and, for their lower mobility, they are more forward looking since they enjoy
a longer utility flow from local public goods.
Many studies support the hypothesis that vote-facilitating rules, such as weekend voting or mail
voting, do increase turnout since in the first case voters have more time to go to the polling
stations and in the second case the cost and the nuisance of voting is lowered (Blais 2006). Jiang
2018 underlines the fact that citizens with an higher income would prefer to vote in the case
of weekend voting, since if they should vote during their working hours it would be way more
costly for them to do so, this means that a higher labour income lowers turnout in working days
since the opportunity cost of voting is higher.
There are mixed theories on the effect of marriage on turnout, Jiang 2018 asserts that "marriage
may depress turnout if married couples need to spend time with their children at home, which
prevents them from going to the polls. On the other hand, if couples have school-aged children
that they drop off to school and the pooling stations are close to local schools, it might be
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convenient for them to vote.". However, in his study the overall effect hasn’t a significant effect
on turnout, at least not in the case of Local elections.
1.2.2 Number of Parties and Parties Polarization
Past literature has shown that there is a self-evident relationship between number of parties and
the level of turnout (Jackman 1987); "as the more parties voters have to choose from the greater
the chance that a voter will find a party close to his or her preferred position" (Wilford 2017).
On the other hand, more recent studies proved that there were some mixed results on the effect
of number of parties; for example, Nikolenyi 2010 article showed that the number of parties
have an inverse relationship with turnout, even if these results are not statistically significant.
The predictive results of number of parties on turnout are mixed and modest, for this reason
Wilford 2017 propose an alternative approach that considers jointly the number of parties and
the polarization of the party system.
As defined by Wilford 2017, "polarization represents the "spread" of the parties across an
ideological spectrum, or how polarized a party system appears to voters". The theory of party
polarization presupposes that a higher level of political differentiation generates a higher turnout.
The reasons underlying a higher turnout due to a polarized system are linked to the fact that "the
ideological spread of a party system should affect the range of choices available to the voter and
the voter’s proximity to a favoured party". The simple idea is that it’s easier for a potential voter
to find a party whose ideology is closer to his preferences when the system is more polarized;
moreover, if a citizen can find easily a party that embodies his preferences it is more likely that
he would vote since voting is seen "as an opportunity for individuals to express their political
view. A wide political spectrum stimulates individuals to vote, which then increases levels of
turnout." (Wilford 2017).
Wilford 2017 points out that there exists a conditional relationship between party polarization
and number of parties and that it’s not reasonable to assume that they work independently since
they both form the political system in which the voter forms his political choices. By implement-
ing "multiplicative interaction models with fixed effects for countries and year" and by using the
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project data that included 26 democracies, Wilford 2017
was able to show that a highly polarized system with few parties increments turnout, whereas,
many parties and low polarization level reduces turnout.
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1.3 Models of mobilization
In this section we are going to have a brief summary of the two main models of voting mobi-
lization in which we are going to show how voters decide if it is better to vote or opt out and
how electoral rules may have an impact on turnout.
1.3.1 Pivotal voter model
The classic problem of voting rationality on electoral turnout was firstly introduced by Riker
and Ordeshook 1968 whose work inspired several theoretical studies on rational choice and
turnout. This model states that an individual vote only if the probability that his vote is going to
influence the outcome of the election and any benefit that he might get by the act of voting fully
compensates the costs of voting itself.
The model implies that it is rational to vote if:
pB + D > c (1.1)
Where p is the probability of his vote being decisive of the election, B is the benefit he gains
if his favourite candidate does win, D are any direct benefits gained by the simple act of voting
(an example might be the sense of fulfilment), whereas c are the costs of voting. In reality,
with this model it wouldn’t be rational to vote for a normal individual since p is extremely small
in democracies and mass elections; however, individuals tends to overestimate p in the case in
which they still do vote even if the benefit of voting is small (D small). This explains why
individuals still vote, as Cox 1999 summarize, "p is extremely tiny in any mass election, the
model predicts that no one should vote unless B is toweringly large, voters systematically and
grossly overestimate p, or D ≥ c.". The model, however, doesn’t take into account the role
that institutions might have on turnout and on the incentives that parties might have to mobilize
voters. For this reason it is interesting to see Cox 1999 model on electoral rules and the calculus
of mobilization.
1.3.2 Electoral system and mobilization
It is well described in the literature of electoral participation that the electoral system has a sig-
nificant effect on mobilization and thus turnout. Cox 1999 provides us a definition of electoral
system: "By an electoral system I mean a set of laws that regulate electoral competition between
and within parties" and he shows "how electoral laws affect parties’ mobilizational incentives".
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In this study Cox 1999 theorizes a mobilization model in which he implements a "calculus of
mobilization"4 that makes it possible to predict how different electoral systems drives parties to
mobilize for voters and in the same time how voters react to parties’ mobilizational effort. Par-
ties usually prefers to target with their mobilization effort citizens that are "embedded in denser
social networks" (Cox 1999) since they are more likely to spread their political preference and
mobilize other potential voters5. For this reason, when parties decide who to target the best
choice would be citizens that have a strong community ties due to long residence or citizens that
are involved with churches activities.
The model is structured as:
usS(V(e)) + uPP(S(V(e))) > c(e) (1.2)
In this model e is the effort, us and up are respectively the seats in the legislature and the
control over executive portfolio utilities. Hence, the parties’ effort for mobilization are going
to translates in increments in votes V(e) that translates in an increase in parliamentary seats or
in executive portfolio6. So the parties are going to execute effort to mobilize voters if the sum
of the utility increment given by the effort is strictly higher than the cost of effort (c(e)). From
this model it is clear that parties are going to mobilize citizens depending on how their effort
translates into votes (V(e)), how those votes translates into seats (S(V)) and how seats translates
into executive portfolios (P(S)).
It is shown that the level of effort increases when the possible result of an election is really close,
we know thus that closeness of an election increments turnout; indeed, as stated by Denver and
Hands 1974 "higher turnout in marginal seats7 is rarely a product of a ’rational’ appreciation
of the situation by voters, but results from parties crating greater awareness amongst voters or
simply cajoling them into going to the polls.".
With this model Cox 1999 confronts some different electoral rules and how these rules affect
the convenience of parties to exert effort and mobilize potential voters. The model is able to
predict which type of electoral system have a structure of rules that improves turnout through
parties’ mobilization effort.
It is proven that the structure of the electoral system have a significant effect on turnout; However,
when comparing for different Electoral Systems the evidence is moderate, nevertheless, most of
4In Cox 1999 model, mobilization is seen as a group of activities that are regulated by the electoral system
itself. Those activities are: coordination between different parties, persuasion of voters to mobilize and possibly
to drive secondary mobilization, this means that voters themselves mobilize other voters to support their preferred
party. This set of activities drives turnout, since the more people are mobilized the more people do vote.
5Secondary mobilization.
6Parliamentary seats S(V) and executive portfolio P(S).
7Hence when the election is close.
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the literature tends to confirm that proportional systems boost turnout more than single member
plurality systems.
1.4 Democracies and decline in turnout
"In the last 50 years, observers have noted with some concern decline in rates of voter turnout
in democracies across the world" (Wilford 2017).
Numerous studies highlight the drop in turnout in established democracies, Wilford 2017 points
out that turnout have dropped from an average of 80% to 50% in more recent times. For this
reason, it is interesting to focus on some of the possible causes of this decline.
As Kostelka 2017 highlights, "according to conventional wisdom, democratic consolidation
depresses electoral participation because by the time democracy is consolidated, voters have
become disillusioned with democracy or are apathetic in the face of reduced electoral stakes".
However, by conducting a study on 91 democracies Kostelka 2017 proved that the decline in
voter turnout didn’t occur in all the consolidations processes but only in one out of two consoli-
dated democracies. In this article it appears evident that the consolidation of a democracy itself
isn’t the only aspect that have a significant effect on the decline of turnout, in fact another major
cause is the democratization contest8.
As summarized by Kostelka 2017, two theories tried to explain the peak in turnout during the
democratic consolidation. The "stakes-based hypothesis", that relies on the fact that voters are
more incline to vote when there is "more at stake" in an election, helps us to understand why the
turnout in the early phase of a democracy is usually higher. This is explained by the fact that
the form of the new regime is going to be chosen in this election, so it has a greater importance
for citizens’ lives. In stark contrast with the "stakes-based hypothesis", the "disenchantment hy-
pothesis" gives as an explanation for the higher initial turnout the "generalized enthusiasm and
citizens’ unrealistically raised expectations for the new democratic regime". The second theory
is also linked with the subsequent decline in turnout because it states that the decline is caused
by the confrontation with the reality of a democratic system that leads to a disenchantment and
to a lower turnout.
The democratization context itself has a strong effect on the initial mobilization. Indeed, the
way in which the democratic change occurred might have a strong effect on turnout, it seems
obvious that if it came from an internal revolution or from an external international intervention
8Democratization is the the process in which an authoritarian regime adopts a democratic elected government.
This process ends when the first democratic election takes place. Instead the democratic consolidation is the process
in which citizens gets used to the new democracy.
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the level of turnout would be different. Moreover, there are also intrinsic effect linked with the
voting habits of the country, these are involved with the participation during the democratization
phase, therefore the way in which the election were held before the democratization phase have
a significant effect on turnout.
One of the possible reasons that Kostelka 2017 points out for the decline in turnout might be the
"demobilizing mechanism" that is linked with the disenchantment hypothesis. This mechanism
captures the fact that the reasons that lowers turnout aren’t present while a democratic regime
changes but appears when it is fully consolidated. As a matter of fact, Kostelka 2017 describes
this disenchantment in the perfect way "when people realize that democracy is not a panacea for
all social and economic problems and that the power of the people to affect decision-making is
limited, their political efficacy and their willingness to vote will decrease", of course the disen-
chantment hypothesis is not based solely on the psychology of the voters, but also on the actual
performance of the new democracy, hence, the worse the performance of the new government
the lower the level of political participation.
Other factors that might have a strong impact on the decline of turnout might be liked with the
generational change of voters. In fact, it doesn’t seem plausible to assume that the citizens’
characteristics are unchanged throughout generations. As we all know, in the last 50 years there
have been strong changes in the technological, economical and social aspects of everyday lives.
Moreover, citizens are on average better educated and informed on politics. It seems that these
global changes have had an effect on the political engagement and have shifted citizens’ pref-
erences of political participation from electoral voting to other forms of political participation
(Vetter 2015, Jackman 1987, Kostelka 2017).
1.5 First and Second Order elections
Nowadays, in most countries, the responsibilities of a government are split between the supra-
national, the national and sub-national level. These different authorities are directly elected by
citizens; hence it is possible for the population to choose national, local and supra-national (i.e.
European) representatives.
Reif and Schmitt 1980 developed the concept of First and Second Order elections that explains
the different attitudes to elections for the various level of authorities. Citizens give a greater
importance to the First order election and thus the turnout is expected to be higher than in the
Second order election. The literature agrees that National election are First order elections,
whereas the Second order election usually comprehends all the other types of election (Munici-
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pal, Provincial, Regional and European elections).
One of the most relevant characteristics of the Second order election is that there is "less at stake"
since the supra-national and sub-national authorities have lower power and fewer responsibilities
than national parliaments. In fact, most of the times, the authority of the Second order election
could not decide the tax level or the level of public services that citizens are going to have
(Mattila 2003), the population understands this and give to the Second order election a minor
importance than to the national election. "Since less is at stake in secondary elections, fewer
voters may consider them sufficiently important to cast ballots" (Reif and Schmitt 1980), for this
reason the lower importance of this type of elections diminish the level of overall participation;
however, this reduction is also explained by the fact that parties themselves are less interested in
votes and mobilize less citizens than in national elections. Media too are less involved in Second
order elections, in fact, they normally give less coverage to Secondary elections and "a generally
subdued campaign means that fewer voters may even learn that elections are being held" (Reif
and Schmitt 1980). Media might be interested in Second order election for other reasons than
the elections itself, in fact, they might use this election results as a proxy of citizens’ opinions
on the government performance. Voters might use Second order elections to reward or punish
the national government rather than expressing their real preference (Cabeza 2018).
The less at stake dimension implies that voters tends to casts their vote less strategically. We
can safely assert that in more important elections citizens may prefer bigger or more established
parties in the general area of their political preference. They might prefer more established
parties that doesn’t represents perfectly their preferences because they think that these parties
have an higher chance of winning an election rather than a niche party. However, they might
actually prefer a smaller or a newer political party and, since there is less at stake in a Second
order elections, they are more prone to show their real preference9. For this reason bigger parties
tend to gain a lower share of the votes than in First order elections and usually the government
party does loose votes as Reif and Schmitt 1980 proved in their article.
In Second order elections most of the voters tend to choose who to vote for by taking into
account factors that are linked with others electoral levels, this means that when voting for the
European Parliament many citizens cast their vote thinking about national level issues and not
focusing on the European level issues. A complex institutional setting with many levels of
different authorities makes it harder for the population to get the relevant information about the
responsibilities, the policies and the performances at each level (Cabeza 2018). For this reason,
the population might decide that acquiring these information is too costly and would prefer to
9Heath and Ziegfeld 2018 empathized the fact that since there is less at stake in a Second order election voters
are less worried to waste their vote, for this reason they are more prone to vote for parties that have no real chance
to actually form a government like a new or a small party.
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infer their political choices from the national level for all the other electoral levels.
In more recent studies, Regional and Local elections seems to have a different behaviour than
expected by Second order nature elections. Level-specific considerations are taken into account
by voters in these elections, for this reason many recent studies classify Local and Regional
elections in between First and Second order elections. In this line, Heath et al. 1999 says "if
the elections to the European Parliament are regarded as second-order, then we might think of
elections to local councils as ’one and three-quarters order’".
Cabeza 2018 study is focused in the micro-foundations of First order thinking in Second order
elections10 and by using a self reported Spanish survey, adjusted by the actual individual be-
haviour, she was able to prove that First order thinking was high in Regional and Local elections,
whereas, in European elections is rather unusual11. Moreover, individual that have an higher
level of education or a higher level of political awareness are more likely to increase First order
thinking in all types of elections.
1.6 Concurrent elections
Literature on turnout confirms the positive and significant effect of concurrent elections on
turnout. Concurrent elections do increase the decisiveness of the votes’ results "with regard
to the distribution of power and policy-making authority in the political system, thus creating
stronger incentives for parties to mobilize and for voters to participate in the electoral exercise."
(Nikolenyi 2010). On the other hand, it is proved that by separating elections the level of turnout
would be lower and, as we have already discussed, a low turnout leads to a bad representation
of citizens’ political preferences.
However, in most federal states concurrent elections are seen in a negative way; in fact, in
countries like Canada or Australia the separation of elections on different levels of authority12
is regulated by law. In Australia the separation of the elections is ruled by the Commonwealth
Election Act of 1918, whereas in Canada it is simply a convention to preserve the autonomy of
the different levels authorities. In federal states it is usual to keep separate national and sub-
national elections because federal states believe that this distinction safeguards the autonomy of
10Here Cabeza 2018 focus her research on individual level factors that affects citizens to vote thinking about
specific level issues.
11In fact, Cabeza 2018 reports "whereas only a minority takes European issues into account when voting in
European elections, most people report that local and regional issues determine their behaviour in local and
regional elections, respectively". She proved that First order thinking in European elections might happen in
the case of a positive opinion for the EU, to confirm this result the probability of First order thinking between
Eurosceptics is really low.
12The so called vertical alignment.
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both of the national and state level authority (Nikolenyi 2010).
In Nikolenyi 2010 article, it was discussed the change in timing of elections for the federal case
of India. This change resulted in the separation of national and sub-national elections that until
1971were held in a concurrent election. Separate elections of national and sub-national pools in
India have lead to the formation of new local parties that were more responsive to local needs and
to an higher autonomy for the federal states. However, separated elections have also resulted in
a lower level of participation and on weaker incentives for the voting population when deciding
whether to vote or to abstain from voting. The Indian case proves that the decline in turnout is
one of the costs of the adoption of non-concurrent elections.
The general argument against holding concurrent elections for more levels of authorities13 or
holding all the elections for the same level across all states in the same day14 is the loss of
autonomy for the less relevant election. This is due to the fact that the "more at stake" election
might get more attention and people might vote not thinking about the responsibilities and
competences of the authorities they are voting for but, as we already have discussed before, by
inferring informations from the "more at stake" election. This would imply that the election re-
sults would be more uniform vertically as national parties would exert an higher mobilitizational
effort and media would give an higher coverage to national parties rather than local parties.
Nevertheless, this does not always happens, for example, as Vetter 2015 explains in the case of
German states local elections concurrent to national election: " the option to cumulate and split
votes in local elections in many states today weakens the influence of parties and places greater
weight on individual candidates. Thereby national parties’ impact on local electoral results is
less strong than might be expected.". In stark contrast with common literatures’ knowledge,
Vetter 2015 affirms that "a stronger vertical and/or horizontal alignment would not only lead to
higher local turnout, but local politics would generally be awarded a more visible role in the
multi-level political decision making process in Germany.".
It would be interesting to see how the timing of Second order elections, being concurrent or
separate from First order elections, have an effect on turnout. Which would be the effect of a
Second order election on the turnout of a First order one and vice-versa? How does the turnout
of two Second order concurrent election behaves? Vetter 2015 addresses these questions in
her publication, in fact, she investigates whether combining local and European elections does
have an effect on citizens’ perceptions on the importance of these elections, and if concurrent
elections of local and European level authorities does increase overall turnout. The study argues
that organizing combined elections is more cost efficient than running two different elections
13The so called vertical alignment.
14The so called horizontal alignment.
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both for the monetary costs that the government have to bear and it is also cost efficient from
the point of view of voters. In support to this statement, voters might feel that there is more
at stake in concurrent elections and their voting costs’ are reduced, indeed, it is more costly to
go to the pooling station and cast two votes in different days rather than cast two votes in the
same day in the same electoral office. For these reasons the opportunity of casting two votes in
one trip increase citizens’ willingness to vote, Vetter 2015 article results prove that a concurrent
elections of a local and a European Parliament election does increase turnout by an average of
3% to 4% points when compared to separate elections.
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Chapter 2
Italian electoral system
As defined by Cox 1999, the electoral system of a country is the set of rules that determines
how politicians are elected in the various level of authorities and how the votes are counted to
determine the final outcome. In this chapter we are going to summarize the main aspects of
the Italian electoral system. After the discussion on these main characteristics, we are going to
focus in separate sections on the rules of the elections that will be relevant in our analysis.
Since 1945 the whole Italian population was entitled to vote1 and from 1975 the voting age was
lowered from 21 to 18 years for most of the elections, nowadays, only the Senate of the Republic
still requires citizens whose age is above 25 years to vote for its composition2.
The Chamber of Deputies is composed by 630 deputies, any citizen could be elected as deputy
if he meets two main requirements: being at least 25 years old and not being disqualified from
the public offices3. Whereas, the Senate of the Republic is composed by 315 senators and each
region couldn’t have less than 7 senators4. A citizen to be eligible to become a senator should
met the same requirements as a deputy, the only difference is that the required age is at least 40
years of age5.
Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic are elected every five years in a
concurrent election, this election might be postponed only in case of war6 and could be called
in less than five years only on extraordinary cases7.
It is possible to vote from abroad for the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate of the Republic and
for the European elections8, on the other hand, it is not possible for Regional, Provincial and
1Hence female were entitle to vote too.
2For further details please refer to Article 48 and 58 of the Italian Constitution.
3For further details please refer to Article 56 of the Italian Constitution and article 28 of the Italian Penal Code.
4With the exception of Molise and Valle d’Aosta that have 2 and 1 senator respectively.
5For further details please refer to Article 57 and 58 of the Italian Constitution and article 28 of the Italian Penal
Code.
6For further details please refer to Article 60 of the Italian Constitution.
7As it happened in 2008 elections.
8For further details please refer to Article 48 of the Italian Constitution.
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Municipal elections; in fact, if an Italian citizen desire to vote for one of those elections, the
only way is retuning to Italy and asking for the possibility to vote in its own Municipality.
2.1 Chamber of Deputies election
The Chamber of Deputies elections that are relevant in our analysis are the 2008 and 2013
elections which refers to the same law: Calderoli law, that is also called "Porcellum".
The law n. 270 of 21 December 2005 (Calderoli law) was used for the 2006, 2008 and 2013
elections, in January 2014 some of its parts were declared against the Italian Constitution and it
was fully abrogated in 2017. The most discussed features of this law were the closed lists and
the Majority premium.
During the political campaign parties have to submit their political agenda and decide which of
the party components would be the leader of the party. Parties might decide to form a coalition
and, if they do so, they should indicate who would be the leader of the whole coalition.
Citizens are able to vote only for fixed lists of candidates, making it impossible to cast preferences.
This gave parties a huge power to decide their internal compositions in the two Chambers. Once
voted the seats were assigned to the coalitions and then to the lists on a proportional level with
some restrictions. The threshold for a seat in the Chamber of Deputy was set at 4% for a party
outside a coalition and at 10% for a coalition. Inside the coalition an ulterior threshold of 2%
was set in order to get a seat.
The seats are then divided between the parties following the largest remainder method; in this
method it should be defined the Hare-quota which is simply Q = totalvotestotalseats and from this quota it
is possible to calculate the number of seats for the party i by Seatsi = VotesiQ . Most of the times
the result is not an integer number, hence, the remaining seats are divided between the parties
depending on Ri = Votesi − (ISeatsi ∗Q), in which ISeatsi is the integer part of the previous
expression. Each party is ordered in a decreasing manner depending the value of R and the
remaining seats are assigned between the parties starting from the one with the higher value of
R.
The 630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were elected by three different circumscriptions:
• 1 seat was elected directly by Valle d’Aosta region.
• 12 seats were elected by Italian citizens that lived abroad through foreign voting. The
foreign section had the possibility of casting a preference while voting, so they didn’t have
the closed lists like the rest of the Italian voters.
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• 617 seats were elected by the rest of the Italian territory.
Finally, the party or coalition that received the most votes in the election, but wasn’t able to
reach by itself 340 seats was awarded the remaining seats through the majority premium taking
the seats in a proportional way from other parties.
2.1.1 Chamber of Deputies: 2008 election
The 2008 election was called before its normal 5 years gap, it was anticipated due to the collapse
of the Prodi’s government that happened on the 6th of February 2008. In fact, the previous
election was in 2006 and the established government governed for only 2 years.
This election was held on Sunday 13 andMonday 14 of April, and the final turnout for the Italian
territory9 was of 80, 51%10.
Berlusconi’s coalition won these elections but they were forced to leave the government due to
the sovereign debt crisis to Mario Monti executive government in 2011.
2.1.2 Chamber of Deputies: 2013 election
The 2013 election was called after its normal five years gap between elections, however, it
happened after the collapse of Berlusconi’s government in 2011 and Mario Monti’s executive
government resignation in 2012. The law that ruled this political election was still Calderoli law
even if there were pressures on the previous governments to change this electoral law.
The election was held on Sunday 24 and Monday 25 of February and the final turnout for the
Italian territory11 was of 75, 20%12; the turnout was indeed lower than the previous political
election.
In this elections there were four main coalitions:
• Bersani’s coalition, which leader was selected through an internal election;
• Berlusconi’s coalition, whose return to the political arena stopped the internal election
process for the selection of the coalition’s leader;
9Excluding foreign voting, which turnout was only 38, 95%, and Valle d’Aosta region, which turnout was
83, 45%.
10Data available from the Ministry of the Interior in the "Archivio storico delle elezioni".
11Excluding foreign voting, which turnout was only 31, 59%, and Valle d’Aosta region, which turnout was
76, 96%.
12Data available from the Ministry of the Interior in the "Archivio storico delle elezioni".
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• Grillo’s coalition, a new coalition whose possible parliamentary members were chosen
through an internal election between the members of the five stars party that haven’t
already run in previous elections;
• Monti’s coalition, that decided to continue its political work after the resignation in 2012.
The final result of the election was really peculiar: the Chamber of Deputies election was won
by Bersani’s coalition with only a 0, 3% difference with the second most voted party, neverthe-
less, their coalition gained the majority premium. In the Senate of the Republic, instead, the
majority wasn’t reached by any party. This problem was solved with the establishment of Letta’s
government in which Bersani’s coalition and Berlusconi’s coalition ruled the country together.
2.2 European election
The European elections in Italy are regulated by Law of 24 of January 1979, n. 18, also called
"Elezione dei membri del parlamento Europeo spettanti all’Italia" that was slightly modified
by Law 20 February 2009, n. 10, that introduced a threshold of 4% to be elected and by Law
22 of April 2014, n. 65, in which they implemented some rules for gender parity in the three
preferences that might be cast in the election.
Citizens that are entitled to vote are any Italian citizen that are at least 18 years old and that
are registered in the voting lists; moreover, it is possible to vote for any European citizen that
has formally requested to do so in the municipality where they do live. Any citizen, Italian or
European, can be elected if the required age of 25 years old is met and if he isn’t already working
for an incompatible position13.
It is possible for Italian citizens that live abroad to vote in three ways: they might return to Italy
to vote, they might request to vote from abroad in the Italian consulate or they might request to
vote for the representatives of the European country in which they live.
The Italian territory is divided in 5 circumscription: North-Oriental Italy, North-Occidental
Italy, Central Italy, Southern Italy and Insular Italy. The 73 seats of the European parliament
are divided between the five circumscription in a proportional way depending on the number of
citizens living in that circumscriptions as reported in the most recent census. Voters are able to
cast three preferences in their circumscription, however, as stated in Law 22 April 2014 n. 65
those preferences couldn’t be for three candidates of the same gender, in fact if this is the case,
the third preference is eliminated.
13For further details please refer to Article 3 and 4, Title II, of Law 24 of January 1979, n. 18.
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As already mentioned before, lists should reach at least the threshold of 4% to gain seats in
the European parliament and those seats are divided between the elected following the largest
remainder method14.
2.2.1 European election of 2014
The European election of 2014 was held on Sunday 25th of May. The overall turnout of the
election for the Italian territory was of 58, 69% and the turnout for Italian citizens voting from
foreign countries was of 5, 92%. The most voted party was "Partito Democratico", whose leader
was the Prime Miniser of Italy Matteo Renzi, with the vote share of 40, 82% and resulting seats
of 31 out of the 73 for the Italian territory15. The two others most relevant parties for vote share
and resulting seats were Five stars movement16 and "Forza Italia"17.
2.3 Regional and Municipal elections
For what concerns the Regional and Municipal elections, in our analysis we are interested in the
fact that citizens to be entitle to vote should be at least 18 years old, hence the same entitled voters
of the Chamber of Deputies election and of the European election. Furthermore, it is important
to underline that the usual gap between two Regional election or two Municipal election is 5
years, this gap can be reduced only in extraordinary cases like for the national elections. On the
other hand, it is not possible for Regional and Municipal elections to vote from abroad.
14For further details please refer to "Chamber of Deputies election" section.
15Data available from the Ministry of the Interior in the "Archivio storico delle elezioni".
16With share of votes of 21, 16% and resulting seats of 17.
17With share of votes of 16, 81% and resulting seats of 13.
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Chapter 3
Data
The data used for the analysis are derived from three different sources. Mainly, the required
data for the core analysis is available in the "archivio storico delle elezioni" that is held in the
website of the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The second data source is a set of databases
from ANCITEL, that is an association that provides services for the "Associazione nazionale
dei comuni italiani" (ANCI). The last source is ISTAT website for the regional GDP.
3.1 "Archivio storico delle elezioni" databases
The "archivio storico delle elezioni" is an online data source in which it is available to the public
the complete list of the results of any electoral consultation since 1946 for the "Assemblea
Costituente", since 1948 for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic elections,
since 1979 for the European elections and since 1970 for Regional, Provincial and Municipal
elections. The informations available in this online data source is based on the "Direzione
Centrale dei Servizi Elettorali" documentation.
For the analysis, six databases were requested from the Ministry of the Interior data source:
• The 2008 Chamber of Deputies election ballots;
• The 2008 Municipal election ballots;
• The 2013 Chamber of Deputies ballots;
• The 2013 Regional election ballots;
• The 2014 European election ballots;
• The 2014 Municipal election ballots.
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These six databases have a common structure, in fact they all report the same information on
a municipal level for the various elections. After the basic information on the date and type of
election, it is reported the circumscription if needed (i.e. in European elections), the region, the
district and the municipality for which the data are reported.
The data collected for each municipality is the number of eligible voters, which are the citizens
eligible by law to vote who are registered in that municipality as voters, and the number of
male eligible voters from which number we can infer the number of female voters. Then it is
reported the actual number of voters, the actual number of male voters, the number of empty
voting sheets and the number of valid votes.
In the case of municipal elections there might have been more than one observation for some
municipalities, in fact if there has been a second election pool due to a non decisive result in
the first election another observation was reported for the second ballot; however, we are not
interested in this information and we have dropped the second observation.
It is evident from Table 3.1 that the number of municipalities does change in the three national
elections.
Table 3.1: Municipalities
Election Year n. of municipalities
Chamber of deputies 2008 8027
Chamber of deputies 2013 8018
European 2014 7983
Municipal 2008 423
Regional 2013 2058
Municipal 2014 3918
The table shows the number of municipalities in each database after excluding Valle d’Aosta municipalities.
In the analysis and in this table we have excluded Valle d’Aosta region because, being an au-
tonomous region, it has a different regulation in the Chamber of Deputies election and, since
this might involve a bias in our analysis, we have excluded it.
The difference in the number of municipalities in the national elections is given by the fact
that some municipalities have disappeared or have been merged with other municipalities1. For
example, between 2013 and 2014, 57 municipalities ceased to exist and 24 new municipalities
were created by merging the ceased ones. The decision to remove or create a municipality is
1There are also few cases in which municipalities have been transferred from one region to another. An example
is the case of seven municipalities (Casteldelci, Maiolo, Novafeltria, Pennabilli, San Leo, Sant’Agata Feltria and
Talamello) that in 2009 were transferred, after a local referendum, from Marche to Emilia-Romagna region.
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taken by the region itself after a "referendum consultivo" involving the local population2.
The municipalities created by the fusion of the removed municipalities had the Municipal elec-
tion on the 25th of May 2014; however, we excluded from the sample all the municipalities in
question. In fact, in order to have a coherent sample we have dropped from the final database
the municipalities that have been removed or created between the first election in consideration3
and the last one4.
In Table 3.2 are reported the regions involved in the sub-national elections that we are using
in our analysis. In the case of the 2013 Regional election as we have seen in Table 3.1 the
municipalities involved are all the 2.058 municipalities in the three regions considered (Lazio,
Lombardia, Molise). Whereas, in the 2008Municipal election only 423municipalities out of 15
regions were involved; similarly, in 2014, 3.918municipalities have voted in 16 different regions.
Table 3.2: Regions involved in Local elections
Municipal - 2008 Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia Romagna,
Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte,
Puglia, Toscana, Umbria, Veneto.
Regional - 2013 Lazio, Lombardia, Molise.
Municipal - 2014 Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia Romagna,
Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte,
Puglia, Sardegna, Toscana, Umbria, Veneto.
The Table shows in which Regions there was an election in each election year. In the Regional election the
regions involved were only three but all the municipalities in those regions have voted, instead in 2008 and
2014Municipal elections the regions involved were respectively 15 and 16 but only some of the municipalities
in those regions have voted.
In our analysis the dependent variable is the turnout, defined as the share of actual voters on
eligible voters. We are interested in the turnout of the National elections. It is directly reported
in the "archivio storico delle elezioni" that the overall turnout for the Italian territory5 was:
• 80, 51% in the 2008 National election;
• 75, 20% in the 2013 National election;
2For further details please refer to article 15 and 16 of D. Lgs n. 267/2000 "Testo unico delle leggi
sull’ordinamento degli enti locali".
3In this case the elections of 2008.
4In this case the elections of 2014.
5We are considering the Italian territory without Valle d’Aosta region, hence we are not considering foreign
voting too.
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• 58, 69% in the 2014 National election.
These numbers seem coherent with turnout’s literature, in fact, we see that there is a decline
in turnout6 and it seems quite clear the Second order nature of the 2014 election, that is an
European election7. It is interesting now to see how the turnout, defined as the share between
actual voters and eligible voters, on municipal level is distributed across the unrestricted sample.
In Figure 3.1 it is plotted the kernel density distribution of the turnout across the municipali-
ties in 2008National election and in the following Table 3.3 are reported some relevant statistics.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of turnout for the 2008 Chamber of Deputies election
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The graph plots the kernel density across municipalities of the turnout in the 2008 Chamber of Deputies election.
Table 3.3: 2008 - Chamber of Deputies election summary statistics
Observations 7.948
Mean 0,812
Standard Deviation 0,063
Skewness -1,209
The sample of this analysis comprehends all the Italianmunicipalities with the exception of Valle d’Aosta region
and the municipalities that have been removed or created between the 2008 election and the 2014 election.
From this plot we have an idea of the distribution of turnout across the municipalities in 2008.
It is possible to see in Table 3.3 that the average turnout of our unrestricted sample is 0, 812
with a standard deviation of 0, 063. Moreover, as we can see from the plot the distribution of
6As we have discussed in the section "Democracies and decline in turnout".
7As we have discussed in the section "First and Second Order elections".
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turnout in the election has a long left tail, this is confirmed by the negative value of the Skewness
(−1, 209). A long left tail means that most of the observations are concentrated in the right part
of the graph, in fact most of the observations are close to the mean, this is confirmed by the low
standard deviation.
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.4 show the same plot and statistics for the 2013 National election.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of turnout for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election
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The graph plots the kernel density across municipalities of the turnout in the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election.
Table 3.4: 2013 - Chamber of Deputies election summary statistics
Observations 7.948
Mean 0,749
Standard Deviation 0,077
Skewness -0,969
The sample of this analysis comprehends all the Italianmunicipalities with the exception of Valle d’Aosta region
and the municipalities that have been removed or created between the 2008 election and the 2014 election.
In 2013 the average turnout is lower than in 2008, in fact, the average turnout is of 0, 749, a result
that is quite close to the reported data in the "archivio storico delle elezioni", and the standard
deviation is higher than the one calculated for the 2008 election since its value is of 0, 077. The
plot still show a long left tail but it is less accentuated than before as we can see from the less
negative value of the skewness −0, 969.
Finally, Figure 3.3 and Table 3.5 show the distribution of municipal level turnout and the same
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summary statistics for the 2014 National election.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of turnout for the 2014 European election
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The graph plots the kernel density across municipalities of the turnout in the 2014 European election.
Table 3.5: 2014 - European election summary statistics
Observations 7.948
Mean 0,613
Standard Deviation 0,155
Skewness -0,496
The sample of this analysis comprehends all the Italianmunicipalities with the exception of Valle d’Aosta region
and the municipalities that have been removed or created between the 2008 election and the 2014 election.
In this graph it is easy to see that the 2014 National election is different in terms of turnout’s
distributions from the precedent National elections. This plot shows that there is a different
approach of citizens when they have to decide whether to vote or opt out in European elections;
this proves the Second order nature of the European election. In fact, it is evident from the
average turnout of 0, 613 that voters are participating less than in the previous two cases and
the higher standard deviation of 0, 155 proves that in different municipalities citizens tends to
have a different participation. Moreover, even if the skewness of −0, 496 in 2014 elections is
still negative, there are way more municipalities that have a turnout so low that is not even
comparable with the previous two cases.
We need to remember that the calculated value of the turnout is going to be different form the
one reported in the Minister of the Interior website since we have already excluded from the
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analysis the municipalities that have ceased to exist or that have been created in the 2008 - 2014
period and we have already removed from the European election Valle d’Aosta region.
The final number of municipalities that are present in our sample is 7.948, this is the number of
municipalities that haven’t changed in our selected period. For the analysis we are interested on
how the turnout of the national level election is affected by a concurrent election in the case of
a Local concurrent election to the National election of 2014 and, in an alternative setting, in the
case of a Local concurrent election to the 2013 National election.
In the analysis we are not interested in the data for the Local elections (Regional and Municipal
elections). We are not interested in their overall turnout or other possible data, we are instead
interested in the fact that they happened in some municipalities in the same time to another
election. For this reason, we are going to use the information on the Municipal and Regional
elections as dummy variable to see if there has been a concurrent election in the municipality
in question. To create this set of dummies the databases of the local elections were merged in
Stata to all the national level election and the resulting three databases were then appended to
form a unique database.
3.2 2011 ANCITEL databases
ANCITEL is the technological services provider for ANCI association; ANCI is the national
association of Italian municipalities. The databases provided by ANCITEL report a wide range
of informations for all the Italian municipalities in 2011. The data are provided by various
sources, for example some of the data comes from the ISTAT population census of 2011. The
data collected in these databases covers these characteristics for all the Italian municipalities
on a municipal level: Agricultural aspects, Industrial and Services characteristics, Population
characteristics and Income informations.
We have selected from these databases some informations that might influence voters behaviour.
For the income characteristics of the municipalities we have selected the share of houses, fami-
lies, employed citizens and cars on the municipal population. With regards to the characteristics
of the municipality we have chosen the number of agricultural holdings, the numbers of employ-
ers in the service sector on the population and the ratio of job demand and job offer. Whereas
for the characteristics of the citizens in the municipality we have selected the education level
(Degree, High school and Elementary level of education), the share of male and female voters
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on eligible voters, the age of the population8 and the share of foreign citizens over the municipal
population.
In order to test the fact that the municipalities that have voted in the 2014municipal election are
as good as randomly assigned we have implemented a balance test over these characteristics.
We want that the sample is homogeneous between the treated and untreated municipalities; this
is testable through a balance test. With a balance test you are regressing the treatment on the
chosen characteristics; if the treatment is insignificant with respect to the characteristic you are
testing for, the sample is balanced and the treatment is randomly assigned. For example, if we
want to see if the number of houses is balanced with respect to the treatment9 we are going to
implement this OLS regression:
Housesi = a0 + a1Li + bXi + i (3.1)
The parameter of interest is a110, this coefficient should be non significant for the sample to
be balanced. The controls (Xi) used in the regression are: Regional fixed effects, the mean
altitude of the municipality, the population density in the municipality, the disposable income,
the level of unemployment and the regional GDP. We have included time invariant controls at
the municipal level to account for some fixed characteristics of the municipality. Since there is
a problem of heteroskedasticity, as it is possible to check through the Breusch-Pagan test, we
have calculated the robust standard errors to account the fact that the residuals’ variance isn’t
constant.
In Table 3.3 are reported the results of the balance test. To see if the sample is balanced and
if there aren’t characteristics of the municipalities that makes it more likely to have a Local
election in 2014 we have to focus on the significance of the Local election (Li) coefficient; if
it is insignificant the sample is balanced, if it is significant theremight be problems in our analysis.
8The the share of age on the population has been divided in three level: Young if their age is between 0 and 14,
Adults if their age is between 14 and 65, Old if their age is above 65.
9The treatment in our case is having the concurrent election in 2014, hence Municipal and European election.
10The treatment’s coefficient.
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Table 3.6: Balancing
Variables Municipal election Standard Error P-value R2
Houses -0.023 (0.016) 0.159 0.347
Families -0.001 (0.001) 0.603 0.588
Agricultural holdings 0.008*** (0.003) 0.002 0.294
Service sector employer -0.009*** (0.002) 0.000 0.271
Employed 0.003** (0.001) 0.022 0.758
Auto 0.001 (0.003) 0.776 0.364
Education: Degree -0.002*** (0.001) 0.004 0.364
Education: High school -0.002** (0.001) 0.044 0.463
Education: Elementary 0.003** (0.001) 0.030 0.621
Male voters 0.001 (0.000) 0.117 0.114
Female voters -0.001 (0.000) 0.117 0.114
Job Demand/Offer 7.758*** (2.384) 0.001 0.100
Age: 0-14 -0.001 (0.001) 0.334 0.277
Age: 14-65 -0.002 (0.003) 0.444 0.228
Age: +65 0.001 (0.001) 0.338 0.409
Foreign citizens -0.003** (0.001) 0.018 0.453
Observations 4664
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The variables are reported as the share over the population, only the share of voting man and female are the
share over the eligible voters. The sample size is the same in each regression.
Most of the characteristics that we are testing for are balanced (not significant), however, some
of them are not. For some characteristics the treatment has a small but significant effect, so it
seems that the sample is not balanced for these characteristics. Nevertheless, we have to take
into account the fact that we are implementing a multiple comparison, in fact we are performing
multiple analysis on the same sample of data. By implementing multiple analysis on the same
sample of data the family-wise error rate increase and the Type I error increase11. For this reason
it might be appropriate to apply the Bonferroni Correction. In the Bonferroni Correction the
p-value threshold to reject the null hypothesis is reduced by dividing the usual threshold by the
number of statistical analysis performed (in our case it is necessary to divide the usual threshold
11Type I error: erroneously reject the null hypothesis when it is actually true.
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by 16, the number of analysis performed on the same sample). In this way the threshold of
rejection of the null hypothesis is lowered.
Since we are performing a multiple comparison to implement the balance test, it is probable that
once reduced the p-value threshold for significance the characteristics of the municipalities that
are now significant might become insignificant. For this reason it is probable that the sample
is balanced between the treated and the untreated municipalities even if, without applying the
Bonferroni Correction, some characteristics appears unbalanced.
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Chapter 4
Empirical strategy
The purpose of this study is to asses whether multiple elections have a significant effect on
turnout. Differently from the main literature on turnout we are going to analyse the aggregate
response on turnout to a concurrent election, hence we are not interested on the voters’ individual
behaviours nor we are interested on the actual result of the election. For this reason we are going
to focus on the municipal level turnout and how it is affected by the concurrence of two elections.
Since we are using data on an aggregate level, the effect of concurrent elections on turnout can be
found by using a Difference in Difference model (DD). A DD estimation consists on identifying
the effect of a specific treatment through the comparison of the difference in the outcomes post
and pre treatment for the groups affected by this treatment to the same difference for the groups
unaffected by it (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
In our analysis the regressors varies at municipal level, for this reason, also the unobserved
cofounders do vary at municipal level and we have three years of observations on turnout for
these municipalities. Thus, it makes sense to implement a strategy that uses data with a time or
cohort dimension to control for unobserved but fixed omitted variables.
We are considering three National elections in three different years1 and a Difference in Differ-
ence model is the perfect tool to deal with the time invariant cofounders and compute the causal
effect of concurrent elections on turnout. Indeed, the DD model is appropriate when the bias is
given by fixed factors and the regressor of interest varies only at a more aggregate level (Angrist
and Pischke 2008).
The identifying assumption is that a common trend exists and in absence of treatment there
wouldn’t be deviations from this common trend. This means that in our case there should be a
common trend in turnout in each of the three National election; we are interested in the slope
of this trend, not in the intercept. In fact, even if the level of turnout is different in the three
1We are considering the Chamber of Deputies election of 2008, the Chamber of Deputies election of 2013 and
the European election of 2014.
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elections it is not a problem for our identification assumption to hold as long as the trend is
the same. As Abadie 2005 points out the common trend hypothesis might be implausible if
there are pre treatment characteristics that are associated with the outcome variable and if these
characteristics are unbalanced through the two groups (treated and control groups). To be sure
that our identifying assumption holds we are going to implement common trend tests and we
are going to implement two robustness checks of our results.
The Differences in Differences model sets up a treatment control comparison2 and, as Angrist
and Pischke 2008 point out "one potential pitfall in this context arises when the composition of
the implicit treatment and control groups changes as a result of treatment". This means that if
there are spillovers from a municipality to another caused by the treatment, the results of the
analysis are going to be biased. However, this problem, that could arise using a DD model, is
not relevant in our analysis. In fact, in our case, we are reasonably sure that moving from a
municipality to another and thus changing legal residence is not linked with the treatment itself.
Indeed, it wouldn’t make sense to change legal residence only to vote in a concurrent election.
4.1 The empirical model
In the baseline specification of our model we are using three years of data, we have the 2008
National elction, the 2013 National election and the 2014 National election. The structural
equation of the baseline specification is:
Turnoutmt = a0 + a1Lm + a2T13t + a3T14t + a4LmT13t + a5LmT14t + bXmt + mt (4.1)
In which Turnoutmt is the turnout level defined as actual voters on eligible voters, T14t is the
dummy that identifies the 2014National election, T13t instead identifies the 2013National elec-
tion, while Lm identifies the municipalities that had the Local election in 2014 (the concurrent
election). The parameter of interest is a5, which is the effect of multiple elections on turnout.
We expect that a4 is insignificant; in fact we expect that the municipalities in which there has
been a Local election in 2014 shouldn’t be different from the others municipalities that hadn’t
the election in 2013, the pretreatment year. Hence, if a4 is insignificant the common trend
hypothesis holds and the treated municipalities are randomly selected from the sample. We add
the regional controls3 and we allow for interaction for period and regions in order to allow for
2In our case the treatment group is composed by the municipalities that had the concurrent elections, whereas
the control group is composed by the municipalities who didn’t have the election.
3We are using 19 regional controls instead of 20 because we have excluded from the analysis Valle d’Aosta
region.
34
temporal effects to vary at regional level4. Finally, mt is the error term.
The base assumption of the Differences in Differences model is that there is a common trend,
hence without the concurrent election the 2014 election should have had the same trend as the
previous two elections. The common trend assumption do hold if the coefficient a1 is close to
zero and the municipalities that had the concurrent election are not different from the others that
didn’t have it in 2013 (a4 should be insignificant).
We are including two additional specifications for our baseline. In the second specification we
add to the model time invariant municipal characteristics that comes from the 2011 database
(Xmt). The characteristics are the same discussed in the section "2011 ANCITEL databases".
This means that we are controlling for the number of houses and auto in the municipality over
the inhabitants, the number of families, agricultural holdings and service sector employers (how
rural is the municipality), the employment level and the share of job demand and offer, the level
of education of the population in the municipality, the numbers of eligible male and female
voters, the age level of the population and the share of foreign citizens on the total inhabitants
of the municipality.
This second specification should show if fixed characteristics of the municipalities do affect the
treatment selection. If there is an effect of this characteristics the common trend hypothesis
does not hold, whereas if these characteristics do not affect the treatment, the common trend
assumption holds (a1 does not change when we include controls).
In the third specification we are including in the analysis the municipality fixed effects. In this
last specification, we are not including the 2011 municipal controls of the second specification
because it wouldn’t make sense since these characteristics are at municipal level and by account-
ing for the municipality fixed effects we are already considering them.
To solve for serial correlation issues we have clustered at the municipal level in all three speci-
fications.
4.1.1 Pretreatment - verification of the common trend assumption
In the first robustness check we are focusing on two election years, the 2008 and the 2013
National elections. We a going to implement a simple Difference in Difference estimation in
this two years, in which the treatment is still the 2014 concurrent election, hence we are testing
the effect of a treatment that hasn’t occurred yet. For this reason for the common hypothesis to
hold we need that the effect of the treatment is null.
4This is done through a set of time-region dummy for 2013 and 2014 for the regions included in the regression.
In our equation both the regional controls and the time-region dummies are included in Xmt .
35
The model in consideration will be therefore strucutred as:
Turnoutmt = a0 + a1Lm + a2T13t + a3LmT13t + bXmt + mt (4.2)
As before Turnoutmt is defined as the ratio of actual voters on eligible voters. The variable
T13t represents the National election of 2013. The variable Lm is a dummy variable that gets
the value 1 if there has been the concurrent election in 2014, and this lets us divide the sample
between treated municipalities (Lm = 1) and control municipalities (Lm = 0). The parameter of
interest is a3, which is the effect of a concurrent election in 2014 on the turnout of 2013. We
expect that a3 is insignificant for our assumptions to hold.
Moreover, as in the previous case, we are going to add the regional controls and we going to
include the interaction between period and regions in order to allow for temporal effects to vary
at regional level (Xmt). In this case the period-region interaction is only between 2013 and the
19 regions included in our sample.
As in our baseline, we are conducting two additional specifications for this robustness check.
These two specifications are the same as in the baseline, in fact, in the second specification
we are adding the municipal characteristics as controls and in the second we are including the
municipality fixed effects.
Finally, to solve for serial correlation issues we have clustered at the municipal level in all three
specifications.
4.1.2 Close elections - 2013 and 2014 national elections
In the second robustness check we are going to implement a Difference in Difference estimation
for the years 2013 and 2014. This case is particularly interesting because, even if the two
National elections considered are different5 the proximity of the two elections make it less likely
that there has been significant shocks that might have caused a deviation from the assumed
common trend. Moreover, the vicinity of these two elections imply that it is likely that the
political and economical aspects that might affect the municipalities are unchanged in this short
time period.
The equation used for this estimation is:
Turnoutmt = a0 + a1Lm + a2T14t + a3LmT14t + bXmt + mt (4.3)
5AChamber of Deputies election and an European election are different not only for the sets of rules that defines
them but also for the perception that voters have on them as we have discussed in "First and Second Order election"
section.
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In which theTurnoutmt is defined as the share of actual voters on eligible voters, T14t represents
the 2014National election and Lm is a dummy variable that identifies the municipalities that had
the concurrent election in 2014, LmT14t represents the interaction term of having an National
and Local concurrent election in 2014. In this model we are adding regional level controls and
mt is the error term.
The coefficient a2 shows the difference in turnout between the 2014 National election and the
2013National election, assuming that the common trend holds, if this coefficient is significant it
tells us that the trend between the two elections differs in the intercept. Whereas, the parameter
of interest is a3 which is the effect of the concurrent election on the 2014 National election
turnout.
As in the previous two cases we are going to implement additional specifications. In the first we
are going to add as control variables the 2011 municipal characteristics and if their inclusion in
the model doesn’t affect the a1 coefficient we can say that there aren’t municipal characteristics
that makes it more likely that a municipality have a concurrent election. If the a1 coefficient is
not affected by the inclusion of these characteristics we can say that the concurrent election is
random, hence the treatment is randomly assigned between the municipalities. If the treatment
is randomly assigned through the municipalities, the common trend assumption holds and the
results of this model are informative.
The third specification includes municipality fixed effects. In this specification the municipali-
ties are treated as if they were included as dummy variables in the regression. We expect that the
regional level controls are going to be omitted because of collinearity. Finally, as in the baseline
and in the first robustness check cases we are going to cluster at municipal level to account for
serial correlation.
4.1.3 An alternative setting
In 2013 there has been a Local election6 concurrent to the National election in three regions: in
Lazio, in Lombardia and in Molise. It is now interesting to see what is the effect of this different
Local election on the turnout of the 2013 National election. We can already expect that the
effect is going to be lower than the one of our baseline7 since the National election of 2013 is a
Chamber of Deputies election; it is a First order type of election and already have a high level
of voters’ participation.
In this specification we are using two years of data for implementing a Difference in Differences
6The Local election in consideration is a Regional election concurrent to the 2013Chamber of Deputies election.
7European and Municipal concurrent election.
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approach. We are going to use the 2013 National election as the one in which there is the
treatment (the Local concurrent election) and the 2014 National election as the pre-treatment
year. In this way we are switching the two years and for the purpose of the analysis we are
treating the 2014 election as if it happened before the 2013 election. Hence, in this analysis the
pre-treatment is in year 2014 and the treatment happens in 2013; in addition, the treatment is at
regional level for the three regions that had the Regional election.
The model is therefore defined:
Turnoutmt = a0 + a1Lm + a2T13t + a3LmT13t + bXmt + mt (4.4)
As in the previous cases Turnoutmt is defined as the share of actual voters on eligible voters,
T13t identifies the 2013 National election, Lm represents the municipalities in which there has
been the Local election in 20138, LmT13t is the interaction term of having the simultaneous
election at Local and National level in 2013, while mt is the error term.
The parameter of interest is a3, which is the causal effect of concurrent election on the 2013
National election turnout. We expect that this effect is lower than the one of our baseline because
we are considering a First order election that should already involve a high number of voters.
In this case we are going to cluster at regional level, this type of clustering, even if it is necessary
to deal with serial correlation issues, might give us biased standard errors since we are in the
contest of few clusters. In fact, the Italian regions are only 20, way below the 42 threshold
proposed by Angrist and Pischke 2008. Moreover, we are excluding from the sample Valle
d’Aosta region since it has a different regulation for the Chamber of Deputies election and this
difference might lead to biased results. For this reason, the total number of clusters is 19 so it is
important to highlight that it is likely that the standard errors are going to be biased.
In this alternative setting we are going to implement two other specifications as in the previous
cases. We are going to include in the second specification the 2011 municipal characteristics to
test our common trend hypothesis but we are clustering at regional level. In the third specifica-
tion we are still including the municipality fixed effects but we are going to cluster at regional
level.
4.2 Inference issues
The Differences in Differences estimates and standard errors are computed through an Ordinary
Least Squares regression in a repeated panel of data on a treated and a control group for at least
8Lazio, Lombardia and Molise.
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one year before and after the treatment. The standard errors thus calculated are likely to be
subject to a serial correlation problem that lead to a biased estimate of the standard errors.
Bertrand, Duflo, andMullainathan 2004 discussed thoroughly how the Differences in Difference
estimation can be subject to a relevant problem of serial correlation. This serial correlation
biases the standard errors estimates and the magnitude of this bias is linked on how much the
independent variable is serially correlated and on the length of the time series9; a positive serial
correlation10 in the error term causes a downward bias on standard error estimates, whereas a
negative serial correlation is going to report an overstatement of the standard errors. Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004 identified three factors that make serial correlation an important
issue to take into account in DD models:
1. usually DD estimation uses long time series;
2. the dependent variables inDD estimation are typically highly positively serially correlated;
3. The treatment variable changes only a little through the different periods. Usually, the
treatment has value 0 until the treatment occurs and then changes its value to 1.
For this reasons, it is important to discuss serial correlation in DD models and choose a way to
deal with it in the analysis.
In order to solve the serial correlation problem in our analysis we have clustered our standard
errors at the municipal level11 and calculated the robust standard errors in order to account for
any within cluster correlation due to unobserved cluster effects12. Angrist and Pischke 2008
highlight that, in the case of heteroskedasticity of the regression residuals, robust standard errors
lead to an asymptotically valid inference; however, they work well only in situations in which
heteroskedasticy is really relevant. In addition, in cases in which there is a problem in correlation
over time in the data, so a serial correlation problem, like it happens when estimating a DD
method, the asymptotic approximation relies on a large number of clusters.
Another way proposed by Bertrand, Duflo, andMullainathan 2004 to deal with serial correlation
is to collapse the data into only two time periods, pre treatment and post treatment13. We are
going to implement a specification that uses only two years but we are still going to use clustered
data with robust standard errors. These two ways of accounting for serial correlation do work
9The longer the time series the the higher the bias might result.
10As in our case.
11It is important to cluster at the appropriate level, usually the most appropriate level to cluster is the most
aggregate level feasible (Abadie et al. 2017). In this case it is appropriate to cluster at municipal level in the
baseline model and at regional level in the alternative setting.
12AsWooldridge 2010 suggests, the clustering of our sample requires the use of White standard errors to account
for heteroskedasticity.
13Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004 propose a third way to account for serial correlation: Randomization
Inference. This procedure is not feasible for our analysis hence we won’t consider it as a possible solution.
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well only in case that the sample size is large enough and there is a sufficiently high number of
clusters.
When econometricians deal with data presenting a group structure they have to remember that,
if the regressors varies only at the group level, not accounting for this factor leads to a sharp
increase of the standard errors. AsMoulton 1990 points out there is a possibility that the "random
disturbances in the regression are correlated within groups" and also a low level of correlation
within groups can cause standard errors calculated through a OLS procedure to be downward
biased; this biased standard errors "can result in spurious findings of statistical significance for
the aggregate variable of interest".
The Moulton factor shows how much ignoring the intra class correlation actually leads to an
overestimation of the precision. Using Angrist and Pischke 2008 notation, the Moulton factor
is the square root of:
V(βˆ1)
Vc(βˆ1)
= 1 + (n − 1)ρ (4.5)
In which n is the group size and ρ is the intraclass correlation, whereas V(βˆ1) and Vc(βˆ1) are
respectively the regressions slopes of the correct sampling variance given the error structure and
the conventional OLS variance formula for the regression slope. Here we are considering the
special case where the regressors are fixed within groups and the group size is constant14.
From this equation it is evident that the Moulton factor increases with group size (n) in a finite
sample, this is due to the fact that the lager the groups the fewer the clusters. Fewer clusters
indicate that there is less independent information in the sample (Angrist and Pischke 2008).
When the correlation within the group is really high (ρ is high), clustering has a huge impact on
standard error estimates, instead if there isn’t a within group correlation the group structure is
irrelevant.
A straightforward solution to this problem, between the ones summarized byAngrist and Pischke
2008, is to "generalize the White (1980) robust covariance matrix to allow for clustering as well
as heteroskedasticity". This solution does work well when the clusters are a lot, however, in the
case of few clusters the results are not as reliable.
Both in serial correlation contexts and in Moulton problems few clusters lead to biased standard
errors. In fact, if our sample presents few clusters we are going to underestimate the intraclass
correlation (ρ) in the Moulton problem or the serial correlation.
But how many clusters are necessary to get an unbiased result? Angrist and Pischke 2008
propose 42 clusters as a threshold, hence, if our sample has less than 42 clusters the results are
likely to be unreliable. On the other hand, Pfaff 2013 suggests that the threshold below which
14Of course this equation can be generalized to account for different group sizes and to allow for regressors to
vary on individual level, but to understand the basic idea of the Moulton factor this simplified case is enough.
40
"the bias become sizeable depends on the specific data structure" and suggest to run simulations
in order to understand which is the appropriate threshold for the data in consideration. Cameron
and Miller 2015 agree with Pfaff 2013, they confirm that the threshold for which clusters are too
few might depend on the situation in consideration. In fact, they claim that few clusters might
be between 20 to 50 depending on the case and the characteristics of the data in consideration.
The ideal way to solve this problem would be to collect more data and gain more clusters, but
this is not always feasible15. An interesting solution to this problem proposed by the literature is
the use of block bootstrap since it works well both with Moulton problem and serial correlation
problem.
15For example in our expansion we are clustering for regions, and the number of Italian regions if fixed and well
below the 42 threshold proposed by Angrist and Pischke 2008. For this reason, it is not possible to acquire more
clusters.
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Chapter 5
Results
In this chapter we are going to focus on the results of our analysis and we are going to discuss
if these results are coherent with our hypothesis and the literature. First of all, we are going to
focus on the baseline, then on the two robustness checks and, finally, we are going to present the
alternative setting results.
5.1 Baseline results
The baseline of the analysis is a DD estimation for three years, the National elections of 2008,
of 2013 and of 2014. As we can see from Table 5.1 the number of observations in this sample is
13.992, this means that there are 4.664 municipalities and, hence, 4.664 clusters in our sample.
For conducting this analysis we had to reduce our sample size to be sure that the results wouldn’t
be biased. In fact, we have excluded form the sample Valle d’Aosta region since it has a different
regulation than the other regions in the Chamber of Deputies election. Moreover, we have
excluded from the analysis Friuli-Venezia Giula, Trentino-Alto Adige and Sicilia regions since
in these three regions there hasn’t been the Local election in 2014 and their inclusion in the
analysis wouldn’t be informative since we wouldn’t have a treated and control group in the same
region. Finally, we have excluded from the analysis all the municipalities that have had a Local
election concurrent to the National one in 2008 and in 20131.
In Table 5.1 we can see the results of the baseline analysis for the three specifications described
in the "empirical model" section.
1As we have pointed out in the section "Archivio storico delle elezioni databases", in 2008 there has been
a Municipal election in 423 municipalities concurrent to election of interest, whereas, in 2013 there has been a
Regional election in 2.058 municipalities concurrent to the Chamber of Deputies election.
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Table 5.1: Baseline
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) 0.006*** 0.005*** -
(0.002) (0.002) -
National election 2013 (T13t) -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
National election 2014 (T14t) -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.312***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
National 2013*Local (LmT13t) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
National 2014*Local (LmT14t) 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.194***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Time-region interaction YES YES YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.787*** 0.718*** 0.795***
(0.003) (0.036) (0.001)
Observations 13,992 13,992 13,992
R-squared 0.762 0.801 0.908
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Table we have reported if we have used municipal fixed effects, region-year interactions to let time effects
to vary across regions and if we have included municipal level characteristics as controls in the regression.
Let’s now focus on the effect of the 2014 concurrent election on the 2014 National election
turnout. The effect reported in the Table is positive and significant in all the three specifications
and it shows that the Local election concurrent to the National election boost its turnout by
19, 4%2. This means that, if the assumptions of the model hold, a concurrent Local election to
an National election actually boost turnout in a significant way.
But does the common trend assumption hold in the model? From the results in Table 5.1 we
2From Table 5.1 it seems that all the three specification gives the same result for the effect on turnout, whereas
in Stata the result is really close but not equal, they are equal when rounded to the third decimal place.
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are confident to say that the common trend assumption holds. First of all, the coefficient of
the Local election (in our model a1) is close to zero in the first specification and its value is
not strongly affected by the inclusion of municipal characteristics in the second specification3.
This means that being treated, hence having the concurrent election, does not depend on some
municipal characteristics but is mostly random. If the municipalities that had the concurrent
election are randomly selected the common trend hypothesis holds and this give us the certainty
of identifying a causal effect in our model.
Furthermore, by including in the regression the interaction between the treated municipalities
and the 2013National election (a4 coefficient) we are implementing another test for the common
trend hypothesis. The fact that the coefficient is insignificant tells us that our assumption holds
and that the treated municipalities hadn’t a different behaviour from the others in the year before
the concurrent election. As a result, the fact that both common trend hypothesis tests hold in all
three of the specifications makes us more confident of our results.
It is now interesting to have a look at the coefficients a2 and a3 that shows how the turnout
in 2013 and 2014 respectively differs from the turnout of the 2008 National election. Before
going on with the discussion, it is important to highlight that from the previous tests we can
say that the trends in these three elections are parallel between each others4 and that they are
following a common trend, however there might be a difference in the intercept between these
three elections. From Table 5.1 we can say that in the 2014 National election the overall turnout
was 31, 2% points lower than in the 2008 election, whereas, the 2013 National election has a
turnout of 3, 9% points lower than the 2008 election.
The lower turnout in 2013 and 2014 points out to two issues that we have discussed in the "Lit-
erature review" chapter. It is quite clear that in the period of consideration (2008 to 2014) there
has been a decline in turnout and that the 2014National election, that is an European election, is
a Second order election, in fact, a turnout of 31, 2% point lower than the 2008 National election
can be explained only by the fact that voters think that there is less at stake in this election.
From this analysis we can say that the effect of a simultaneous Local election to the Second
order National election in 2014 have a strong effect on turnout and the concurrent election boost
turnout by 19, 4% points.
3In the third specification the coefficient of the municipal election is omitted because of collinearity; this is
going to happen in all the regression in which we account for municipal fixed effects.
4Since the common trend assumption was verified.
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5.1.1 Differences in North, Center and South Italy
Since the Italian nation is composed by regions that are actually different between each others it
is interesting to split Italy between Northern, Center and Southern regions and repeat the same
analysis in order to see if there are differences in the response to concurrent elections in the
different areas.
The model used in this analysis is the same as the one used in the baseline, the sample is the
same, but we have used only the Northern regions in the first case, the Center regions in the
second case and the Southern regions in the third case.
We can expect that there are going to be some differences not only in the effect on turnout of the
2014 Local and National concurrent election, but it is likely that there are going to be differences
also in the turnout of the 2013 and 2014 National elections compared to the one of the 2008
National election. If that is the case, it means that there are difference between Northern, Center
and Southern regions in citizens’ voting behaviour.
Since we have excluded some regions from our baseline sample, the regions in the North case
are: Liguria, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna and Veneto. The total number of municipalities, hence
clusters, is 2.253. Whereas the number of observations is 6.759 since we are implementing an
analysis on three years of National elections data. The Center regions considered in the analysis
are: Marche, Toscana and Umbria. The total number of municipalities, hence clusters, is 574.
This means that the total number of observations in the center regions sample is going to be
1.722 since we are considering three years of data. Finally, the Southern regions considered
in the analysis are: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sardegna. The total
number of municipalities, hence clusters, is 1.837 and the total number of observations is 5.511
since we are considering three years of data.
It’s important to point out that in the North, Center and South cases the common trend assump-
tion still holds since in all the three cases the Local election coefficient is close to zero and is
unaffected by the inclusion of the 2011 municipal controls, moreover, the municipalities that
had the concurrent election in 2014 have the same behaviour as the others in the pretreatment
year (2013). For this reason we are sure that the common trend assumption holds and that there
are not municipal characteristics that makes it more likely to be treated.
In Table 5.2 we can see the results of the analysis for the Northern regions with the three speci-
fications described in the "empirical model" section.
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Table 5.2: North
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) 0.004* 0.004** -
(0.002) (0.002) -
National election 2013 (T13t) -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
National election 2014 (T14t) -0.282*** -0.282*** -0.282***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
National 2013*Local (LmT13t) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
National 2014*Local (LmT14t) 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Time-region interaction YES YES YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.853*** 0.921*** 0.821***
(0.002) (0.061) (0.001)
Observations 6,759 6,759 6,759
R-squared 0.589 0.687 0.855
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Table we are including only the Northern regions of the baseline model sample. Hence, the regions
included are: Liguria, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna and Veneto.
From the results of the Table 5.2 we see that the concurrent Local election boost the turnout
of the 2014 National election by 14, 6% points. This result is a bit lower than the one of our
baseline. The decrease in turnout from the 2008 National election to the 2013 National election
is the same one on the main analysis (3, 9%), instead the decrease in turnout of the 2014National
election is a bit lower (28, 2%).
In Table 5.3 we can see the results of the analysis for the Center regions with the three specifi-
cations described in the "empirical model" section.
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Table 5.3: Center
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) 0.010*** 0.009*** -
(0.003) (0.002) -
National election 2013 (T13t) -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
National election 2014 (T14t) -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.228***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
National 2013*Local (LmT13t) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
National 2014*Local (LmT14t) 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Time-region interaction YES YES YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.824*** 0.918*** 0.836***
(0.003) (0.095) (0.001)
Observations 1,722 1,722 1,722
R-squared 0.696 0.750 0.879
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Table we are including only the Northern regions of the baseline model sample. Hence, the regions
included are: Marche, Toscana and Umbria.
In Table 5.3 we see that the concurrent Local election boost the turnout of the 2014 National
election by 16, 1% points, a results that is still lower than the one that we have found in our
baseline model. This might mean that the Southern regions are the ones in which the effect of a
concurrent election is higher, we are going to see in Table 5.4 if this is the case.
Differently from the previous case the decease in turnout in 2013 is of 5, 7% points whereas the
decrease in turnout in the 2014 National election is of 22, 8% points.
In Table 5.4 we can see the results of the analysis for the Southern regions with the three speci-
fications described in the "empirical model" section.
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Table 5.4: South
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) 0.007** 0.007** -
(0.003) (0.003) -
National election 2013 (T13t) -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
National election 2014 (T14t) -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.362***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
National 2013*Local (LmT13t) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
National 2014*Local (LmT14t) 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Time-region interaction YES YES YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.786*** 0.611*** 0.749***
(0.003) (0.065) (0.001)
Observations 5,511 5,511 5,511
R-squared 0.787 0.820 0.918
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Table we are including only the Northern regions of the baseline model sample. Hence, the regions
included are: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sardegna.
Aswe can see in Table 5.4 the effect of a concurrent election on the 2014 national election turnout
is the highest, in fact, the concurrent election boost turnout by 26, 3% points. The decrease in
turnout is the same as the center regions in the 2013 National election, whereas the decline in
turnout of the 2014 National election compared to the one of the 2008 National election is of
36, 2% points. It is clear that there are differences between North, Center and South Italy, but
is is important to remember that in all the three cases the turnout actually increases thanks to a
concurrent election.
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5.2 Pretreatment - verification of the common trend assump-
tion results
In the first robustness check we are going to implement a DD estimation on two years, the 2008
and the 2013National elections. The sample is formed as in our baseline analysis but the number
of observations is lower (9.328) since we are focusing on only two years of data instead of three.
In Table 5.5 we can see the results of the analysis for the three specifications described in the
"empirical model" section.
Table 5.5: Pretreatment - verification of the common trend assumption
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) 0.006*** 0.004*** -
(0.002) (0.002) -
National election 2013 (T13t) -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
National 2013*Local (LmT13t) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Time-region interaction YES YES YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.787*** 0.761*** 0.795***
(0.003) (0.035) (0.000)
Observations 9,328 9,328 9,328
R-squared 0.538 0.662 0.920
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Table we have reported if we have used municipal fixed effects, region-year interactions to let time effects
to vary across regions and if we have included municipal level characteristics as controls in the regression.
50
It is easily seen that, as in the baseline case, there is a decline in turnout from the 2008 election
to the 2013 election; in fact, the turnout of the 2013 election is lower by 3, 9% points when
compared to the one of the same kind of election in 2008.
In this robustness check we are going to confirm, by making some changes in the analysis, that
the common trend assumption holds. First of all, in this case we are focusing on only two
election years before the actual concurrent election and the results concerns two election of the
same kind5.
The common trend hypothesis needed for the DD estimation to be informative is verified by
the coefficient a1 that is really close to zero and doesn’t change significantly when municipal
characteristics are included as controls to the regression, this means that the sample is homoge-
neous between treated and untreated municipalities even when we control for many municipal
characteristics.
In the same line, from the coefficient a3, hence the difference in the 2013 turnout for the munici-
palities that had the concurrent election in 2014 from the ones who weren’t treated, it is possible
to see that there isn’t a significant difference in turnout behaviour. This means that before the
treatment the municipalities that had the concurrent election in 2014 had the same behaviour
as the ones that weren’t treated. This allows us to confirm that the common trend hypothesis is
supported by this robustness check.
5.3 Close elections - 2013 and 2014 national elections results
The second robustness check is quite interesting because we are going to focus on two elections
that are close in time, only one years between each other; in fact, we are going to focus on
the National election of 2013 and on the National election of 2014. We have already pointed
out that, even if the nature of the two elections is different6 and this might lead to a different
propensity of the voters to cast their preferences, the vicinity of the two elections makes us more
convinced that the common trend assumption holds. In fact, the short period between the two
elections make it less likely that there has been mayor shocks that might have lead the assumed
trend to deviate from its path. To make this aspect clearer we might think that the political
parties haven’t significantly changed and that in one year gap we may assume that the economy
hasn’t changed significantly too.
The sample for the analysis is formed as in the previous two cases and the number of observations
5Chamber of Deputies election.
6Since we are considering a Chamber of Deputies election and an European election that are respectively a First
order election and a Second order election.
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is the same as the one in the previous section case (9.328 observations) since we have two years
of data.
In Table 5.6 we can see the results of the analysis for the three specifications described in the
"empirical model" section.
Table 5.6: Close elections - 2013 and 2014 national elections
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) -0.000 -0.000 -
(0.002) (0.002) -
National election 2014 (T14t) -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.237***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
National 2014*Local (LmT14t) 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.751*** 0.668*** 0.737***
(0.004) (0.044) (0.001)
Observations 9,328 9,328 9,328
R-squared 0.726 0.769 0.908
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the Table we have reported if we have used municipal fixed effects and if we have included municipal level
characteristics as controls in the regression.
When taking into account the 2013 National election and the 2014 National election it is pos-
sible to see that the common trend assumption is verified by the fact that the coefficient of the
treatment (a1) is so close to zero that when we approximate at the third decimal number the
value reported is still zero. This means that the sample is homogeneous between treated and
untreated municipalities; this is confirmed in the second specification, in which we control for
municipal characteristics.
Now that we have discussed that the common trend assumption holds, we can focus on the
different behaviour that voters have between the 2013 National election and the 2014 National
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election. We see that the National election of 2014 has a turnout that is 23, 7% lower than the
one of the National election in the precedent year. This difference seems lower than the one we
have found in the baseline of the analysis, but we have to remember that here we are comparing
the 2014 turnout to the the turnout of 2013 and not to the one of 2008; this value have sense if
we remember that the turnout in the 2013 National election had a decline in turnout from 2008
to 2013. We can say that the difference in turnout reported in Table 5.6 shows the difference
in turnout between a First order election and a Second order election and a bit less the overall
decline in turnout since we are taking into account two elections that are really close to each
other.
Finally, the the concurrent election boost by 20, 7% points the turnout of the 2014 National
election. The effect here is a bit higher than the one calculated in the three year model but still
really coherent in sign and magnitude. For this reason we can safely confirm that this result
is compatible with our main findings and that the concurrent election in consideration actually
boost turnout.
5.4 Alternative setting results
In the extension we are going to focus on the effect of a concurrent Local election on the turnout
of the National election of 20137. The sample, as it is possible to see in Table 5.4, is a bit wider
than the ones in the previous analysis; in fact, we are including in our sample all the regions
with the exception of Valle d’Aosta but we are going to exclude the municipalities that had the
Local election in 2014 and in 2008. The final sample is composed by 7.300 observation, hence
3.650 municipalities reported for two years of data.
It is important to remember that in this case we have switched the years of our analysis. The 2014
National election is treated as if it had happened before the 2013 National election. Moreover,
we have to remember that in this case the treatment is the 2013 Local election concurrent to the
2013 National election and that our aim is to highlight the effect of this concurrent election on
the turnout of the 2013 National election.
Finally, it is important to remember that, in this last case, we have clustered at regional level
instead of at municipal level and the fact that there are few clusters (19 in total) is likely to give
us biased standard error.
In Table 5.7 we can see the results of the analysis for the three specifications described in the
"empirical model" section.
7The two election in consideration are the Regional election and the Chamber of Deputies election of 2013.
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Table 5.7: Alternative setting
First specification Second specification Third specification
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Local election (Lm) 0.078* 0.027 -
(0.042) (0.023) -
National election 2013 (T13t) 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.237***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
National 2013*Local (LmT13t) -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
(0.032) (0.032) (0.046)
Municipal fixed effects NO NO YES
Municipal controls (2011) NO YES NO
Constant 0.483*** 0.163 0.497***
(0.026) (0.114) (0.010)
Observations 7,300 7,300 7,300
R-squared 0.590 0.773 0.920
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In theTablewe have reported ifwe have includedmunicipal level fixed effects andmunicipal level characteristics
as controls in the regression.
The coefficient a2, that is the difference in turnout between the 2014 and 2013 election, is
coherent with the one found in the previous section; in fact, the 2013 National election had a
turnout of 23.7% point higher than the one of the 2014 National election. This is also consistent
with the literature of First and Second order elections since the First order election presents an
higher turnout.
The coefficient of the Local election shows that there is actually a difference between the treated
and untreated municipalities. This is probably linked with the nature of the concurrent election,
in fact we are looking at a Regional election and not at a Municipal election across the whole
Italian territory. For this reason, it is likely that there are some characteristics of this regions that
are different from the others. This is confirmed by the fact that once municipal level controls
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are included in the regression8 this difference becomes insignificant. Of course, in the third
specification this coefficient is omitted because of collinearity as it happened in the previous
cases.
Let’s focus now on the effect of the concurrent election on turnout. From the analysis the effect
that we were searching is insignificant. This means that a Local election simultaneous to the
2013 National election has not any effect on the turnout.
How is it possible to explain the stark contrast between the findings in our baseline analysis and
in this alternative setting? The main aspect that we have to remember is that in our baseline
we were looking at the effect of a concurrent election on the turnout of a European election,
a Second order election, and in the second case we were considering a Chamber of Deputies
election, a First order election.
We already know, from the raw data in the " archivio storico delle elezioni" website that the
2013 Chamber of Deputies election had a turnout of 75, 2% and that the 2014 European election
had a turnout of 58, 69%; this means that the First order election already have mobilized the
citizens that usually do vote, whereas the Second order election mobilizes only a fraction of
this voters. Moreover, as we have seen in the "First and Second order elections" section Heath
et al. 1999 pointed out that the Regional and Municipal elections don’t really behave in terms
of participation as a Second order election but are a "one and three-quarters order", this means
that the participation of this type of election is between the one of a Second order election and
a First order election. For this reason, it might make sense that the concurrent Local election
boost the turnout of the European election, whereas the Local concurrent election has no effect
on the turnout of the Chamber of Deputies election.
8In the second specification.
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Conclusions
By exploiting the Italian case in consideration we were able to show that a concurrent Local
election has a positive and significant effect on the turnout of the 2014 National election. The
effect on the turnout of the 2014 National election is quite strong, in fact the Local concurrent
election increases turnout by 19, 4% points.
The sign of this result is coherent with the literature, however, the magnitude is way higher than
the results found in previous studies. Kostelka 2017 while analysing the sources of the decline in
turnout in 65 countries found that concurrent elections boost turnout by 7, 82% points. Kostelka
2017 result is confirmed by the Indian case presented by Nikolenyi 2010 in which the concurrent
election boost the National election turnout of the major states by 9, 11%. Finally, if we consider
the European case presented byMattila 2003, in which he considers the European level elections
between 1979 and 1999 for all the member states, the increase of European turnout due to a
concurrent election is of 7, 72%.
This difference points out that probably in Italy the general turnout is structurally high9, whereas
the European election turnout differs and shows such a low turnout that is not even comparable
with the other elections. In fact, if we compare the 2014 European turnout to the 2008 Chamber
of Deputies turnout we see that the European election has a turnout that is 31, 2% points lower.
The lower turnout in the European election is explained by the the Second order nature of the
election.
It is interesting that with only three election years the decline in turnout was quite evident; in
fact, in only five years the turnout of the National election has experienced a decline of 3, 9%
points.
The concurrent Local election of 2013 had no effect on the turnout of the 2013National election.
We didn’t expect this result, we expected a effect lower in size but still significant, however it is
possible to find a reasonable explanation for this result. In the extension we were considering
the turnout of a Chamber of Deputies election, a First order election, this is the "more at stake"
election for the voters, hence, we expect that all the citizens that would vote are already voting
9This is potentially linked to the fact that until 1993 voting was compulsory in Italy.
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and a Regional election10 might not be enough for other citizens to mobilize and decide to cast
a vote.
It would be interesting to extend the analysis and see which is the effect of a concurrent election
not only on the turnout of a National election, but also see what happens to the turnout of the
Local election. Which would be the election that gains more form this simultaneous election?
Are there cases of selective abstention as suggested by Degan and Merlo 2011? This would be
particularly interesting to decide which elections should be organized in the same day and which
ones do not gain enough in terms of turnout but only loose autonomy (Nikolenyi 2010).
The result of this research is quite clear. A concurrent election has a strong positive effect on
the turnout of Second order elections but not on First order ones in Italy. For this reason, policy
makers should be encouraged to plan as many concurrent elections as possible for those elections
that have a structural lower turnout in order to make them more representative of the population.
Doing so would not only increase turnout, but would also be cost efficient both for the State, in
monetary terms, and for the population that would have to vote in only one occasion.
10A Second order election, even if Heath et al. 1999 refers to Regional elections as "one and three-quarters
order".
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